| SECRET COMMISSIONS From "Common Elements" Winter 2005 |
Following the ACMO/CCI conference last fall, there was much discussion about "secret commissions" including, for example, whether ACMO Associates could invite property managers to ACMO sponsored events (which practice is currently encouraged). The offence in question is set out in section 426(1) of the Criminal Code which provides as follows: Property managers, as agents for condominium corporations, should be cognizant of this offence. Condominium corporations should also be cognizant of the potential for conflict of interest. In the 1992 Supreme Court of Canada case of R. v. Kelly, the Court inquired into the application of this section. The facts of that case are as follows: a financial planner, Kelly, had persuaded a property development company, Qualico, to give his company the exclusive rights to sell MURBs developed by Qualico. In particular, Kelly influenced his clients into investing in MURBs developed by Qualico, and Kelly received a commission from Qualico for each MURB sold. Kelly did not disclose his arrangement with Qualico to his clients, or at least did not do so in any meaningful way. Prior to his agreement with Qualico, Kelly had not recommended MURBs to his clients, and subsequent to his agreement with Qualico, Kelly did not recommend MURBs to his clients until Qualico had some to sell. In Kelly, the Supreme Court set out three elements to the actus reus ("wrongful act") of the offence and, for each element, the requisite mens rea ("guilty mind") that must be established. The elements of the offence (that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt) are as follows: 1. Actus Reus: existence of agency relationship - Mens rea: agent must be aware of the agency relationship; 3. Actus Reus: failure by the agent to make adequate and timely disclosure of the source, amount and nature of the benefit - Mens Rea: must be aware of the extent of the disclosure to the principal or the lack thereof. From Kelly, it appears that the acceptance of a commission must be done in relation to a specific transaction, or at least for the express purpose of furthering the commission. Cory J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, states at paragraph 40: "Thus, it is clear from the inherent nature of commissions and from Kelly's actions that Kelly knowingly accepted the Qualico payments as consideration for influencing his principals (that is to say his clients) to purchase MURBs." Let me pose two hypothetical situations to suggest a possible way the Kelly decision might be distinguished: Situation I: A manufacturer of widgets says to a property manager: "I will take you out to dinner, and in return you will recommend to the condominium corporation for whom you act as agent that they should buy my widgets." If the property manager does just that, doesn't tell the condominium corporation about the dinner, and the condominium corporation buys the widgets, the property manager has, arguably, committed an offence. Situation II: Now imagine a property manager is taken out for dinner by a manufacturer of widgets who the manager already knows, during which they may talk "shop". Some time later, the manager's condominium corporation decides it needs widgets. The property manager tells his Board: "I know someone who makes widgets, why don't you consider buying your widgets from him?" And, in addition, the prudent property manager will also refer other widget manufacturers to the condominium corporation. In the second scenario, arguably, a charge under section 426 should fail because the property manager did not knowingly accept the dinner as consideration for influencing the condominium corporation to buy its widgets from the widget manufacturer.
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